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Itʼs the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so
far as the nature of the subject admits.
Aristotle (Ethics)1 [1, p. 1730]
This is an excellent collection of essays for all those challenged by the task of understanding
complex phenomena. Current discussions on complexity and related ideas involve various concepts
that can be interpreted in different ways, and that are thus often a source of confusion and vague-
ness. Reading the texts on the subject presented here is therefore a way of expanding our knowledge,
of opening perspectives on controversial issues, and of analyzing current discussions through their
historical conceptual ramifications and developments. There is no doubt that primary sources are
essential to frame and to enlighten contemporary discussions.
From Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) to Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972), this anthology gath-
ers 14 early studies. It contains many of the most important seminal works on complexity. It is
preceded by a general introduction by the editors that summarizes the main lines of the approach.
The editors focus in the first place on the mechanistic approach, and on the way in which a complex
stance differs substantially from mechanism. The latter tends to view mechanical explanation as the
only legitimate scientific explanation, not just in physics, but also in chemistry or biology. The main
tenets of mechanistic explanation are efficient causation and the reduction of whole entities to their
constituent, noninteractive physical components. This approach implies that entities, including com-
plex ones, can only be viewed as mere aggregates of particles ruled by mechanical laws, and involves
a radical rejection of an ontological status of emergent properties in complex phenomena. Accord-
ingly, every scientific explanation of complex entities has to follow the ideal schema of mechanism in
physics: determinism, deducibility, and predictability. This viewpoint on mechanism on the part of
the editors, their rejection of the idea that reductionist mechanism is adequate to account for com-
plex systems, makes the present work into something more than an anthology about “the emergence
of emergence.” It is this viewpoint that actually enables us to discern a clear thread binding the
various articles together, notwithstanding their differences in relation to ontological and epistemo-
logical matters.
The articles can be divided into at least four groups, a division based on the way in which mech-
anism is criticized, undermined, or rejected. Firstly, Kant claims, in contrast to mechanical perspec-
tives, that we need circular causality to adequately account for life. Secondly, British emergentism
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tionary character of nature. Finally, Schrödinger, Poincaré, and Peirce use thermodynamics and
chance to argue for the shortcomings of a deterministic mechanical perspective.
The “Analytic of Teleological Judgment” (1790) by Immanuel Kant inaugurates this compilation.
For Kant, life witnesses of a particular kind of organization. Every part functions for the sake of the
rest of the parts in the organism, and for the sake of the organism as a whole. Unlike a machine, an
organism has formative power (self-propagating power). In this sense, organisms are both cause and
effect of themselves. The causality to which life owes its origin is quite different from the mechanical
idea of efficient causality. Circular causality is the only kind of causality capable of providing a proper
account of life. Kant concludes that organisms are entities that cannot be objectively known purely
on the basis of mechanical laws. Organisms have to be conceived as natural purposes, and require
purpose as a regulative concept to guide our reason in every investigation of life.
A substantial section of the volume is devoted to what McLaughlin called “British Emergentism”
[3]. “On the Composition of Causes” (1843) by John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), “The Order of Qual-
ities” (1920) by Samuel Alexander (1859–1938), “Emergence” (1923) by C. Lloyd Morgan (1852–
1936), and “Mechanism and Its Alternatives” (1925) by C.D. Broad (1887–1971) belong to the first
articulated movement that explored emergence as an alternative to mechanism. Mill formulated the
first crucial distinction between, on the one hand, phenomena in which the joint effect of several
causes is just the additive resultant of their separate effects (e.g., a machine) and, on the other hand,
the cases in which the joint effect is not given by the mere addition of the causes (e.g., life). Starting
from this distinction, the emergentist program conceives of complex entities as discontinuous tran-
sitions of matter. For Alexander such transitions are finite material arrangements of absolute space-
time. New arrangements bring about non-reducible qualities, none of which are exhibited by the
basic component of the configuration. Both Alexander and Lloyd Morgan emphasize the creative
character of emergent evolution. Nevertheless, Lloyd Morgan prefers a description of emergence in
terms of relatedness. Complex entities have supervenient configurations with new relations among
the constituents and other complex entities. Finally, C.D. Broad achieved the most mature treatment
of emergence in this period. Starting from the opposition between emergentism and mechanism,
Broad provides us with a justification of the ontological status of emergents and their relation with
teleology and design.
British emergentism had its effects across the Atlantic. The US philosopher Arthur Lovejoy
(1873–1962) embraced the ontological approach to emergentism that Broad explored previously.
In “The Meaning of Emergence and Its Modes” (1926), Lovejoy discussed the emergence of con-
sciousness and mind as one of the clearest examples of emergence in evolution. Thirty years later, in
“The Concept of Emergence” (1956), the US philosophers Paul E. Meel (1920–2003) and Wilfrid
Sellars (1912–1989) argued that the question of emergence should be answered in terms of observ-
able phenomena and cannot be settled on a priori grounds.
Prediction, stability, and materialism are the main mechanical pillars that Alfred North Whitehead
(1861–1947) and Henri Bergson (1859–1941) attack in “Science and the Modern World” and “The
Evolution of Life—Mechanism and Teleology” (1911), respectively. Mechanism grounds prediction
on the demand that no arbitrary breaks can be introduced in nature. Events are isolated in order to
abstract the laws under which reality develops. However, this can be applied only to non-organic
entities. Organisms are units of emergent value, which are not susceptible to being abstracted
through laws. Therefore, ontological stability in organisms is an artificial result of the mechanical
methodology. Whitehead and Bergson insist on the evolution of organisms not as a mere description
of changes of reversible relations between portions of stable matter. Evolution is a permanent pro-
cess of organic and creative change. No change can escape from its own history. Memory automat-
ically shapes the present; it inherits a certain identity transmitted throughout a historical route of
events and brings about the future.
Change is also the keystone for Jan C. Smuts (1870–1950). Like Whitehead and Bergson, Smuts
supports, in “The Holistic Universe,” a universe ontologically defined by change: A permanently
changing universe evolves creatively through the generation of units of wholeness. Smuts rejects198 Artificial Life Volume 16, Number 2
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spectful of metaphysical concepts like emergence and a philosophy aware of the historical origin of
reason.
Thermodynamics was used by Henri Poincaré (1854–1912) in order to show, in “Mechanism and
Experiment” (1893), the empirical paradoxes of the mechanical program. Reversibility as a necessary
consequence of mechanics is not compatible with experimental facts. Poincaré calls the entire para-
digm of “physical law” and “legitimate explanation” into question. However, it is Charles S. Peirce
(1839–1914) who formulated the most complete critique against mechanism, based on an analysis of
the explanation of thermodynamics. “Design and Change” (1883) refuses radically the main assump-
tion of determinism. Science traditionally considers that if a question is sufficiently investigated by
reasoning and observing, it receives a proper and definitive answer. “Every event has a cause”2 has
been the battle cry of scientific determinism. In contrast, Peirce claims that uncertainty and chance
(in the sense of absence of cause) are underestimated agents of empirical research. Peirce thinks that
the deterministic assumption in science extends itself to another fallacy: scientific laws. Even basic
thermodynamic “laws” have deterministic sense only in terms of statistical value. Peirce went
further: Unlike mechanical force, chance is not dissipative, but concentrative. Chance produces uni-
formity through evolution acting against the dissipation of mechanical forces. Life could be just a
uniformity resulting from chance. Erwin Schrödinger, in “Order, Disorder and Entropy,” apparently
suggested something similar. Even if dissipation in the long run promotes a non-ordered universe,
some transient organized states of order (e.g., life) can postpone the decay into the inert state of
equilibrium. Life would be an entity able to maintain itself through the consumption of negative
entropy.
Significantly, the compilation ends with the influential work “An Outline of General System The-
ory” (1950) by Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Maybe because of his ample experience in biological prob-
lems, Bertalanffy was the first to create a formal system to analyze complex phenomena in practice.
His theory of systems established the mathematical basis to study hierarchical systems composed of
different levels of interdependent causes. He understood complex phenomena as partially mechan-
ical systems, at the most. Individual wholeness is always resisting complete mechanization. Organ-
isms are characterized by stability and equifinality, the latter referring to the capacity of the organism
to reach the same end from very different starting points. Bertalanffy even suggests several scientific
examples as applications of his general theory of systems.
We think this anthology paves the way to situate many important current and future controversies
in relation to complexity. Important unsettled issues such as the plausibility of downward causation
in emergence, or the role of determinism and law in the so-called “special sciences,” depend on our
capacity to understand properly such questions as those dealt with here. To understand the original
meaning of these questions is a necessary step in such a task. Certainly, the reader of this anthology
will find a stimulating challenge to the pervasive mechanical explanatory paradigm characteristic of
large parts of our scientific worldview.
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